Abstract-Do there exist general principles, which any system must obey in order to achieve advanced general intelligence using feasible computational resources? Here we propose one candidate: "cognitive synergy," a principle which suggests that general intelligences must contain different knowledge creation mechanisms corresponding to different sorts of memory (declarative, procedural, sensory/episodic, attentional, intentional); and that these different mechanisms must be interconnected in such a way as to aid each other in overcoming memory-typespecific combinatorial explosions.
I. INTRODUCTION
What can one say, in general, about general intelligence? The answer seems to be: a fair bit of interesting mathematics which has worthwhile philosophical implications, but not much of direct practical value.
Suppose one formalizes the notion of general intelligence as something resembling "generally effective goal-achieving behavior, for complex goal/environment combinations." Then, the tradition of Solomonoff induction [1, 2] , pursued recently by Juergen Schmidhuber [3] , Marcus Hutter [4] and others, has painted a fairly clear conceptual picture of truly general intelligence. There are many more mathematical details yet to be unraveled, but the basic moral of this body of work seems to be that: without some sort of special assumptions about the environment and goals relevant to an intelligent system, the best way for a system to achieve general intelligence is essentially to carry out some form of brute-force search of the space of possible behavior-control programs, continually re-initiating the search as its actions lead to new information.
The problem with this algorithmic approach is that it's incredibly computationally expensive --which leads to the question of the best way to achieve reasonable levels of general intelligence given feasible computational resources. Here the picture is slightly less clear; but, all available mathematical and practical knowledge suggests that achieving useful levels of truly general intelligence (without special assumptions about the world) using feasible computational resources is just not the restrictions are not too severe, one still has a case of interest. But the question is whether there is anything of elegance and scope to say about this case. Plausibly, this case might degenerate into a collection of highly specialized statements about particular classes of goals and environments. On the other hand, maybe there is something sensible one can say about "general intelligence in the everyday world using feasible computational resources," as a topic more restrictive than mathematically general intelligence, but less restrictive than task-specific intelligence like chessplaying, car-driving, biological data analysis, etc.; and less restrictive than "closely humanlike intelligence."
Our goal here is to sketch some ideas that we think can serve as the core of a reasonably general theory of everyday-world general intelligence using feasible computational resources, based on certain broad assumptions about system architecture, which emerge from reasonably but not overly specific assumptions about goals and enviornments.
We deal specifically with the case of "multi-memory systems," which we define as intelligent systems whose combination of environment, embodiment and motivational system make it important for them to possess memories that divide into partially but not wholly distinct components corresponding to the categories of:
• [5] we present a detailed argument as to how the requirement for a multi-memory underpinning for general intelligence emerges from certain underlying assumptions regarding the measurement of the simplicity of goals and environments; but the points made here do not rely on that argument. What they do rely on is the assumption that, in the intelligence in question, the different components of memory are significantly but not wholly distinct. That is, there are significant "family resemblances" between the memories of a single type, yet there are also thoroughgoing connections between memories of different types.
Cognitive Synergy Theory, if correct, applies to any AI system demonstrating intelligence in the context of embodied, social communication. However, one may also take the theory as an explicit guide for constructing AGI systems; and [6] describes one AGI architecture OpenCogPrime, designed in such a way. '
II. ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF COGNITIVE SYNERGY THEORY
The essential idea of cognitive synergy theory may be expressed in terms of the following points:
1. Intelligence, relative to a certain set of environments, may be understood as the capability to achieve complex goals in these environments. 2. With respect to certain classes of goals and environments (as articulated in [5] ), an intelligent system requires a "multi-memory" architecture, meaning the possession of a number of specialized yet interconnected knowledge types, including: declarative, procedural, attentional, sensory, episodic and intentional (goal-related). These knowledge types may be viewed as different sorts of pattern that a system recognizes in itself and its environment. 3. Such a system must possess knowledge creation (Le. pattern recognition / formation) mechanisms corresponding to each of these memory types. These mechanisms are also called "cognitive processes." 4. Each of these cognitive processes, to be effective, must have the capability to recognize when it lacks the information to perform effectively on its own; and in this case, to dynamically and interactively draw information from knowledge creation mechanisms dealing with other types of knowledge 5. This cross-mechanism interaction must have the result of enabling the knowledge creation mechanisms to perform much more effectively in combination than they would if operated non-interactively. This is "cognitive synergy." 6. The activity of the different cognitive processes involved in an intelligent system may be modeled in terms of the schematic implication "Context & Procedure~Goal", where the Context involves sensory, episodic and/or declarative knowledge; and attentional knowledge is used to regulate how much resource is given to each such schematic implication in memory These points are implicit in the systems theory of mind given in [7] but are not articulated in this specific form there.
Interactions as mentioned in Points 4 and 5 are the real conceptual meat of CST. One way to express the key idea here is that most AI algorithms suffer from combinatorial explosions: the number of possible elements to be combined in a synthesis or analysis is just too great, and the algorithms are unable to filter through all the possibilities, given the lack of intrinsic constraint that comes along with a "general intelligence" context (as opposed to a narrow-AI problem like chessplaying, where the context is constrained and hence restricts the scope of possible combinations that needs to be considered). In an AGI architecture based on CST the different learning mechanisms must be designed specifically to interact in such a way as to palliate each others' combinatorial explosions -so that, for instance, each learning mechanism dealing with a certain sort of knowledge, must synergize with learning mechanisms dealing with the other sorts of knowledge, in a way that decreases the severity of combinatorial explosion.
One prerequisite for cognitive synergy to work is that each learning mechanism must recognize when it is "stuck," meaning it's in a situation where it has inadequate information to make a confident judgment about what steps to take next. Then, when it does recognize that it's stuck, it may request help from other, complementary cognitive mechanisms. it pursues a set of goals, which are then refined by inference, aided by other processes. Terms like "inference" are used very broadly here; for instance there is no commitmentto explicit use of a logic engine; from the point of view of CST inference could just as well be carried out as an emergent process resulting from the dynamics of an neural net system. At each time the system chooses a set of procedures to execute, based on its judgments regarding which procedures will best help it achieve its goals in the current context. These procedures may involve external actions (e.g. involving conversation, or controlling an agent in a simulated world) and/or internal cognitive actions. In order to make these judgments it must effectively manage declarative,procedural,episodic, sensory and attentionalmemory, each of which is associated with specific algorithmsand structures as depicted in the diagram. There are also global processes spanning all the forms of memory, including the allocation of attention to different memory items and cognitive processes, and the identificationand reificationof system-wideactivity patterns(the latter referred to as "map formation") process considered in the current version of Cognitive Synergy Theory, categorized according to the type of knowledge with which each process deals. For more thorough characterizations of these ideas, see [7] .
III. THE COGNITIVE SCHEMATIC Point 6 in the above summary of Cognitive Synergy Theory describes how the various cognitive processes involved in intelligence may be understood to work together via the "cognitive schematic"
Context & Procedure~Goal <p>
This formula may interpreted to mean "If the context C appears to hold currently, then if I enact the procedure P, I can expect to achieve the goal G with certainty p." The system is initially supplied with a set of high-level goals such as "get rewarded by my teacher", "learn new things" and so forth; and it then uses inference (guided by other cognitive mechanisms) to refine these initial goals into more specialized subgoals. As noted above, we use the term "intentional knowledge" to refer to the system's knowledge of its goals and subgoals. In the following we will also use the shorthand
C&P~G <p>
In general, the cognitive schematic leads to a conceptualization of the internal action of an intelligent system as involving two "key learning processes":
1. Estimating the probability p of a posited C & P~G relationship 2. Filling in one or two of the variables in the cognitive schematic, given assumptions regarding the remaining variables, and directed by the goal of maximizing the probability of the cognitive schematic ... or, to put it less technically:
1. Evaluating conjectured relationships between procedures, contexts and goals ("analysis") 2. Conceiving novel possible relationships between procedures, contexts and goals ("synthesis"); and when necessary creating new procedures and contexts, via leveraging prior knowledge or as a last resort via trial and error experimentation Given this conceptualization, we can see that, where synthesis is concerned,
• Procedural knowledge, and procedural learning methods can be useful for choosing P, given fixed C and G. Simulation may also be useful, via creating a simulation embodying C and seeing which P lead to the simulated achievement of G • Declarative knowledge, and associated knowledge creation methods, can be useful for choosing C, given fixed P and G (also incorporating sensory and episodic knowledge as useful). Simulation may also be used for this purpose.
• Inference, acting on declarative knowledge, can be useful for choosing G, given fixed P and C. Simulation may also be used for this purpose.
• Goal refinement is used to create new subgoals G to sit on the right hand side of instances of the cognitive schematic • Concept formation and map formation are useful for choosing G and for fueling goal refinement, but especially for choosing C (via providing new candidates for C). They can also be useful for choosing P, via a process called "predicate schematization" that turns logical predicates (declarative knowledge) into procedures. On the other hand, where analysis is concerned:
• Inference, acting on declarative knowledge, can be useful for estimating the probability of the implication in the schematic equation, given fixed C, P and G. Episodic knowledge can also be useful in this regard, via enabling estimation of the probability via simple similarity matching against past experience. Simulation may also be used: multiple simulations may be run, and statistics may be captured therefrom.
• Procedural knowledge, mapped into declarative knowledge and then acted on by inference, can be useful for estimating the probability of the implication C & P~G, in cases where the probability of C & P1~G is known for some PI related to P • Inference, acting on declarative or sensory know ledge, can be useful for estimating the probability of the implication C & P~G, in cases where the probability of Cl & P~G is known for some Cl related to C; and similarly for estimating the probability of the implication C & P~G, in cases where the probability of C & P~G1 is known for some G1 related to GMap formation and concept creation can be useful indirectly in calculating these probability estimates, via providing new concepts that can be used to make useful inference trails more compact and hence easier to construct. The key role of attentional knowledge in the overall functioning of intelligent systems as described by CST must be emphasized. In any real-world context, a system will be presented with a huge number of possibly relevant analysis and synthesis problems. Choosing which ones to explore is a difficult cognitive problem in itself -a problem that also takes the form of the cognitive schematic, but where the procedures are internal rather than external. Thus this problem may be addressed via the analysis and synthesis methods describe above. This is the role of attentional knowledge. Finally, one way to see the essential role of synergy in intelligence as modeled by CST, is to observe that sometimes the best way to handle the schematic equation will be to fix only one of the terms. For instance, if we fix G, sometimes the best approach will be to collectively learn C and P. This requires either a procedure learning method that works interactively with a declarative-knowledge-focused concept learning or reasoning method; or a declarative learning method that works interactively with a procedure learning method.
IV. ENUMERATION OF CRITICAL SYNERGIES
Referring back to Figure 1 , and summarizing many of the ideas in the previous section, Table 4 in [6] enumerates a number of specific ways in which the cognitive processes mentioned in the Figure may synergize with one another, potentially achieving dramatically greater efficiency than would be possible on their own.
Of course, realizing these synergies on the practical algorithmic level will require significant inventiveness and may be approached in many different ways. The primary approach we have pursued involves the OpenCogPrime software design, which introduces specific algorithms for each of the capabilities mentioned in Figure 1 , together with specific mechanisms for realizing the synergies in Table 4 of [3] . The specifics of how OpenCogPrime manifests these synergies are discussed further in [7] .
